The Safeguarding ... series in D-Lib Magazine is intended to suggest technology to help manage digital intellectual property. That technology can contribute only in a complex of administrative, legal, contractual, and social practices is broadly accepted; we now pause to examine how efforts to fit in the technological component are progressing and what next needs attention.
Among concerns for responsive and responsible management of intellectual property, technical aspects are surely secondary to prominent issues of public policy, law, and ethics. The latter are beginning to be addressed both in legislative processes and also by academic investigators. For the technical community, we assert that we can design offerings with sufficient flexibility that we need not wait for policy decisions which might affect software to administer rules chosen or to hinder unacceptable behavior. The current article projects technical directions without designing solutions. It emphasizes managing the data --how it is stored, protected, and communicated.
For just over a year, the Safeguarding ... articles in D-Lib Magazine have discussed software assistance for protecting digital library (DL) contents. The current article presents a stock-taking, a pause to inspect what has been accomplished so far, to see how it falls short of needs which are rapidly becoming better understood, and to consider what should be done next. Our emphasis will be seen to be that of an industrial research team, extending from basics through software designs to questions of practical deployment, access control, but these domains are now seen to be converging.
The technical means are the easy part of a large set of challenges. The hard part is a complex of policy issues and induced social behavior. An example occurs in the universities, which are beginning to face a revolution over intellectual property as technology blurs the lines between good business and good education; this includes the issue of who owns on-line course materials, the institutions or the faculty members who prepared them; see [Woody 1998 ]. Another helpful source is a report commissioned by The U.S. Copyright Office: Sketching the Future of Copyright in a Networked World is just now becoming available.
Long lists of detailed requirements are available in many sources; see, for example, what is said about the access control component [Gladney 1997] . Even more recently, we are presented with statements of requirements, from CNI on authentication and access management for cross-organizational use of information resources [Lynch 1998 ] and from the museum community on user confidence in the authenticity of digital resources [Bearman 1998 ]. From the many writings illustrated by these and from conversations with members of the IBM development and marketing communities, we select some particular requirements that we feel have not received the attention called for by their compelling nature.
The means of access management must be scalable to massive numbers of low unit cost interactions, large numbers of users, immense collections, and constantly changing human relationships.
Each user wants to connect to services only once in a network session, rather than as separate steps for each of many services drawn on.
Interruptions to provide information needed by access management are a distraction for end users --a distraction which can be and should be avoided; similarly, service administrators will not be able to deal with individual grants of authorization for each of many thousands of users, and our manifest ability to automate this must be delivered in software tools rooted in databases.
Different resource custodians want different access rule schemes; we can and should permit all possible rules of access, without exposing the inherent complexity to end users or administrators who are not interested in the "plumbing".
Libraries differ from piles of books and papers because librarians oversee collection development, selecting only holdings within their institutional missions and of known authenticity and provenance, and organize what they select with catalogs and other means; access management systems must help administer the achievement of such values, which cumulatively make for the quality of the collections.
Authorization for library services must fit within other administrative processes, such as university student cards for all privileges and as data backup for networked personal computers.
We demand continuity between delivery from research libraries, scientific databases, and collections of clerical paperwork.
Such requirements are additional to more detailed functional requirements typically emphasized in the literature, and include aspects essential to durable software.
Providing the protections sought has underpinnings which we need to mention, but not further discuss. These include physical security (e.g., network cables should not be exposed to terrorists), operating system security, and other broadly useful measures, as suggested in [IBM 1998 ]. They further include correct and responsible management control of how the serving computers are administered and independent audit of the same from time to time ]. Highly respected guides for these topics were published in 1970 and renewed recently.
For stable library service, in addition to having the right functionality, the technology base must have "industrial strength", viz., handle all sorts of failures gracefully, be extensively tested in the environments in which it will be used, have good user and technical documentation, and be accompanied by long-term commitments for functional and platform upgrades and ready service for unanticipated interruptions. This is affordable only with a sufficient customer base and application breadth; for digital library services, the obvious base includes document imaging applications which are gradually broadening to include multimedia content. This application is sometimes called Enterprise Document Management (EDM); IBM's digital library strategy includes reusing as much as possible of EDM offerings for storing, protecting, and delivering digital documents, and as much electronic commerce technology as applies, recognizing that commerce in physical goods might extend into commerce for digital documents, although the latter prospect is developing more slowly than many people anticipated in 1995. (This fits well with the intention of some research libraries to cover part of their running costs by fee services.)
If one accepts this, one must consider DL information protection tools as extensions of more broadly applicable tools. What follows implicitly draws on encryption, key management, and certificate technology for which there exist good textbooks and evaluations, e.g., [NRC 1996] ; it explicitly discusses access control which assumes personal authentication, with the latter not being further mentioned.
Any information system has a boundary within which its custodians can enforce organization policies. Figure 1 suggests this boundary for the case of a digital collection which includes its own metadata and access control information. We can conveniently separate measures into those effective within this administrative boundary, those which extend the effective administrative boundary, and those far beyond the boundaries; the last encourage proper behavior and hinder unauthorized actions without being able to prevent them. Within the administrative boundary, it is often possible to constrain what software is used to process digital objects and/or to ensure that employees or other institutional members follow defined rules. In administrative boundary extensions of the type discussed below, it is possible to negotiate terms and conditions of document release. Beyond the administrative boundaries, technical means are less effective, so that we must rely on legal and social measures, and develop these beyond what exists today. ]; transmitting rules from where they are generated to where they are needed; efficient payment mechanisms [Herzberg 1998 ]; trustworthy identification of who is generating a rule set (authentication), providing a document, or requesting one; unambiguous identification of the things being protected [Gladney 1998a ]; how administrative data can be bundled with content for distribution ]; and so on.
We do not agree that "trusted systems" [Stefik 1997 ] is a promising concept for document protection, at least not in the next few years and perhaps never because there seem to be fundamental flaws (see [Gladney 1998b ]).
In the early 1990's, when attention was focused on "open distributed systems" and "object orientation", a popular model articulated what was wanted in building blocks from which loosely coupled services could be marshalled for tasks whose purposes were decided late in design progressions. Curiously, this compelling model no longer figures strongly in discussions, even though it effectively communicates design principles for resources that are sprinkled around the network and invoke each other dynamically. The model centers on the concepts of protected resources and related resource managers; suggested in Figure 2 , a protected object is the combination of some data resource (which might be either persistent or ephemeral), and some server and client software which together constitute the resource manager. The only access paths to the data are the API's of the client portion of the resource manager.
The server component confers all the functionality and quality (concurrency, serialization, recovery, integrity, security, ...) properties of the resource.
To avoid redundant software, any resource manager can call other resource managers (more or less as subroutines).
For performance when the client portion and the server portion are co-located, this can be detected automatically when (sub)systems are generated or loaded, followed by choice of optimal communications, e.g., when they are in the same minicomputer and suitable memory protection is provided by the hardware, copying in memory could be used. In layered software, lower layers (those close to the hardware) tend to be more generic (useful to more applications) than higher layers (those close to what users see). To the extent that we can share functionality by pushing it into lower layers, we make this functionality less expensive and better tested. For digital library we certainly do this by using generic file systems, database management tools, and communication services and have to some extent achieved this for the storage subsystem [Gladney 1993 ], which embeds access control services [Gladney 1997 ]. We now see it possible and desirable to push into this layer the database core of authorization management by identifying the similarities and differences of permissions management and access control, and representing the similar things once only for applications which range from enterprise document management to digital library.
Academic applications of document collections differ from clerical applications more in higher layer functions than in lower layer. In each case, library services need to blend into whatever front end applications the end user wants to use for most of his computing workload. For the internal revenue clerk, this is typically a workflow management for rapidly executing similar checking for hundreds of tax returns; for the scholar, it is searching, reading, and extraction as an adjunct to analysis and writing. For some topics, such as environmental studies and public health investigations, researchers partly draw on the same documents as clerical users. Shared lower level tools thus become mandatory, rather than merely a cost-saving tactic.
The similarities between access control databases and permissions databases jump out at you if you inspect the schema sketched in [Gladney 1998b ] with those in [Gladney 1997 ]. As authorization decisions begin to depend on users' organizational roles [Ferraiolo 1995 Access control software developed separately between 1970 and today for different operating systems and for different services within some systems (e.g., OS/MVS files and DB2 relational databases are protected by different software, even though access control functionality is similar for these two resource classes). The access control needs of different subsystems are converging as applications use them together. The complexity presented by marginally different access control solutions for the several services within any single computing complex is not acceptable to administrators; such differences extended to differences among service centers will not be acceptable to end users. We find scores of scholarly papers, touching on:
Requirements in databases, in office applications, in LANs, in more general networks, within file systems, and recently also in information systems access control in object-oriented databases, and in distributed object services; distinctions between military and commercial systems; delegation and control based on organizational roles rather than on user identities and group memberships; and access control as a component of larger security services.
Notwithstanding all this work, the access control methods used by widely deployed software subsystems is only marginally changed from what was designed in the early 1970s. The new work has mostly had no effect.
Our Document Access Control Method (DACM) [Gladney 1997 ] is already well poised to implement what the prior paragraphs of this section call for. It is structured into a model-independent base within which each protected object selects an access control object which includes both access control data (this could be the kind of access control list that DCE file systems provide) and a pointer to some interpreter or permission function. Each of several interpreters would implement an access control model; this could be a role-based model, an object-oriented model, the model [Gladney 1997 ] recommends as particularly suited to office applications, or some entirely new model. As suggested by Figure  1 , several such permission managers can be part of and invoked by a document storage subsystem (the data resource manager portion of a digital library).
We emphasize that thes software structure of the prior paragraph contributes to essential flexibility. Specifically, we already know that different applications favor different authorization models. We further anticipate that different jurisdictions will want different policies (e.g., the French government, in contrast to the University of California). Whenever a new policy is asked for by custodians of a class of collections, we need only create a new permission function (Figure 1 ). Typically the cost of this will be about two person months. Moreover, adding a permission function has no effect whatever on the existing content of a library; existing objects will continue to point to existing access control objects which will continue to point at prior permission functions. The new permission function will come into effect for those objects whose owners choose to use the new function. This treatment of the core of authorization management illustrates why we are confident of being able to implement whatever policy is chosen by the authorities for each collection, and do not need to wait until policies are chosen before we make available the authorization management. In fact, most of what is described in [Gladney 1997 ] is embedded in the IBM VisualInfo product, whose pertinent portions are reused in the IBM Digital Library offering, and has been in use for 4 years.
This dichotomy between supposed needs with suggested solutions and a change pace not suited the pace of introduction of other technologies suggests that we should consider stark alternatives and their consequences.
1. We might accept that we must make do with current access control services for another 20 years; to software engineers and computer sciences, this notion is emotionally unacceptable.
2. We might build a "federating" layer of application level software that intervenes between existing services and users to present interfaces which "paper over" the accidental differences; this approach is being followed by Tivoli Systems (an IBM subsidiary), and is commercially successful, but we cannot help wondering whether this is an interim solution or can be given a sufficient architectural basis to be durable. As to what they attest to: ownership and provenance or authenticity and completeness;
As to whether they are perceptible or impercetible to human beings unaided by machinery;
As to robustness and fragility (fragile watermarks do have useful purposes);
As to whether the information they carry is encrypted or in the clear; and
As to the protected information's representation: text, image, video, audio, etc.
Generally comprehensible reviews of watermarking have just appeared, so the analysis that we might otherwise include here is not needed. [Zhao 1998 ] summarizes the business values of marking. [Memon 1998 ] summarizes image watermarking in terms that non-technical people will be able to understand. [Craver 1998 ] shows that recent proposals include methods readily "cracked" or bypassed if used as litigation evidence. [Mintzer 1998 ] identifies data standardizations to support end users extracting and interpreting watermarks carrying auxiliary information within pictures, to authenticate that information received has not been tampered with, or to show specifically which parts of a picture have been altered. These papers focus on still image marking, treating other media less thoroughly. The technically-inclined reader who wants more depth and pointers into literature which is rapidly developing, may find [Swanson 1998 ] useful; it touches on algorithms and pays attention to marking of audio signals and motion pictures. Faced with some specific question, the experts among us will know which collections are likely to be helpful and will want federated search over a small selection of collections, followed by rapid delivery of the most promising documents, to select manually the most pertinent for the interest of the moment. The less expert will want to explore possible sources rapidly. What is in common is that expert and non-expert collection users will often want rapid access to collections to which they have not been admitted before. They won't want to be interrupted to negotiate access; nor can collection administrators afford to check each individual's credentials --the pace wanted in the wired world will be too high.
Part of what will be needed is addressed in a Cambridge University prototype, whose authors noticed that, although users will rarely have in advance arranged access to external collections (external to their own institutions), prior inter-institutional agreements are already common (inter-library loan) and could be extended to include complex rules about the kind of affiliation users have with their home institutions and possibly on other user attributes (such as having a bank account from which small access fees may be extracted without further human negotitation). [Ching 1996 ] provides a formalization of the needed communication of credentials, without including the notion of prior agreement negotiated by the end user's organization with the informationdelivering organization.
Before projecting the administrative data structures needed to handle the implied scenarios, we need to recall some additional factors: rapid change of institutional membership and even more rapid change of members' privileges within their institutions, and the fact that each end user will belong to several institutions: her university, her city, state, and country, her professional societies, her clubs, and so on. Universities with tens of thousands of students, faculty, and staff, with a turnover of about 20% annually, cannot afford to register each member separately for each service; most already have a single "student card" which extends to libraries, and some are building related digital authentication services to be used by all digital services. Similar less dramatically challenging circumstances exist in commercial and other institutions. When, for example, I seek access to University of California documents for which IBM has already negotiated privileges for Research Staff Members, we all (the University, IBM, and I) want that access to be granted without further human administration. If, however, I also happened to be a University Extension student and if that studentship confered access to a document not available to IBM Reseach Staff Members, we all would be annoyed if I were denied that document.
Given all this, the required data structures and processing are manifest:
Each individual collection user should be described in a single place, together with those attributes wanted for library collection access. This description should identify each institution to which the user belongs. (A single world-wide user descriptor may create serious privacy risks, but we will not address these in this article.)
Each institution should manage an affiliations database which describes each member's privileges. This may include an organizational structure as simple as groupings common in widely-deployed access control services, but is more likely to support more complex relationships as called for by [Ferraiolo 1995] and delegation rules such as those described by [Gladney 1997b ].
Each collection would have a meta-database. Its root record for each holding would refer to an access control object which itself could be a document, could also include conventional access control lists, or refer to rules and rule interpreters as suggested by [Hayton 1998 ] and [Walker 1998 ]. This access control meta-data could be in the same catalog as the collection meta-data, as is described by [Gladney 1997b ] and implemented in an IBM content management product which is reused in IBM Digital Library. However, it could also be held in another database as we do in DataLinks [IBM 1997].
As called for by the applicable standards [ISO 1995], when a user U requested permission P to an object O held by a resource manager RM, RM would pass the meta-data pointers to U, P, and O to a base access control decision function. From O, this would find the applicable access control object A which in turn would indicate which rule set interpreter R was to be used. U would indicate the organizations to which U claimed membership; the base access control service could from these assemble the possibly pertinent descriptors of U. The base access control decision function would pass this marshalled information to the rule set interpreter, which could be of the type described in [Alrashid 1998 ], [Hayton 1998 ], or [Walker 1998 ], which would inform RM whether to grant access and if, not, possibly indicate why not.
If the rules indicated a payment was to be made or decryption keys were required, the foregoing process could use our Cryptolope tm mechanism ]. The specifics of how, when, and where this would be done have not yet been worked out.
All this implies many interprocess communications and undesirable delays. Prudently laid-out databases will, in fact, combine logically independent data so that the objects most frequently used together in individual events are in the same databases. Well-known optimization techniques will ensure that only requests that must traverse networks or even process boundaries in the same processor in fact do so; if this is done well, local accesses will not incur processing overhead or delays simply because the access control subsystem is prepared to handle remotely stored information.
Handling wide-spread distribution incurs one new challenge --more important and more fundamental than the performance issue just alluded to. Implicit in what has just been sketched is a set of inter-dependencies of administrative processes which must trust each other for well-defined purposes. This includes name services and other network services which mediate inter-process connections, so that any process A which is part of the access decision mechanism and is dependent on another process B can decide whether it trusts B's answers for information requested, and also be reasonably confident that the answer truly comes from B rather than a counterfeit.
Hierarchies of trust are needed, following basics of delegated trust articulated in [Abadi 1993 ] and [Lampson 1992 ], who consider the calculus of "speaks for" relationships. The implementation of such basics will be an infrastructure of authentication, certificate management, and underlying encryption and key management tools. Fortunately for the library community, this is being developed rapidly for electronic commerce applications whose risks of malfeasance are more evident and more serious than those of purloined digital information. We can confidently wait on and exploit this e-commerce infrastructure.
In addition to basic standards already alluded to, practical services will have to comply with implementation standards, e.g., for CORBA as in [OMG 1996 ]. Such compliance is part of what is meant by "industrial strength" built into product software but often not into prototypes. Which particular implementation standards should be followed is itself a tricky question, as developing and adopting standards is a slower process than Web software development. Beyond emphasizing the importance of choosing and complying with such standards for stable, long-term service commitments, we don't need to discuss the topic further in this article.
Practical Considerations
What precedes suggests that the techology problems are either solved or well on their way to being solved to the extent that software technology can theoretically mitigate intellectual property risks. This is true, but not enough. For digital library service to be socially and economically significant, it must operate on very large scales and be integrated gracefully into the regular operations of its deploying institutions. Implied are significant engineering challenges which might expose further unsolved fundamental challenges. We cannot simply implement existing designs into offerings acceptable to customers, much less offerings which profoundly please them. Software engineering is still a practical art which requires "production prototypes" --prototypes built to full scale and tested in environments whose users are fully committed to using them, warts and all, as a step towards re-engineered versions which stand a chance of being satisfactory. We (the technology entrepreneurs) are having trouble finding enterprises willing to encounter and overcome the inherent risks in return for the advantages of leading their competitors.
[ Moore's early majority are customers who will not take such risks, who require end-to-end packaged products "integrated" into their businesses (often they are companies that do not wish to employ programmers), and that will not buy unless we can point them at "reference customers" --companies like their own that are using the new technology. Moore's chasm is the gap between early adopters and early majority. We see Moore's model as a useful guide to our current challenge. The current deployment problem for technology to help manage intellectual property is to move from niche encounters based on piece parts, with many different groups faced with integration responsibilities and costs that distract from their missions, to mainstream deployment based on "complete" solutions. This includes technical challenges of a broad system design nature, but the business challenges currently dominate, and we are forced to limit our technical work to those aspects which address barriers to "crossing the chasm". The software producers are unwilling to build to scale without committed user communities. No user community is willing to commit to something it cannot see in operation in a like user community.
More generally, digital library is currently positioned on the brink of the "early adopter" side of Geoffery Moore's chasm (Figure 3) . While design for information protection presents many fascinating technical challenges, progress towards social benefit and business value will in the next few years depend more on practical, deployable solutions to institutional barriers, such as managing information about intellectual property rights and finding ways in which each university can share its digital collection with other universities, and in turn get access to their collections. Particularly the latter challenge is one of more tractable sharing agreements among institutions --more tractable than currently exist --with new views required about the balance between collaboration between institutions and competition in which control of intellectual resources is used to distinguish one institution from another.
In a nutshell, we are just now technology rich. There is opportunity for invention, but progress does not seem to be impeded by missing technology. Instead, the principal impediment is the readiness of document collection managers to work with software developers to bring into committed service tools whose importance prospective customers have emphasized for several years. Their reluctance is understandable because these are database applications from which there is no turning back once adopted, only migration forward with corrections for oversights, and because sometimes no organization wants to be the first to adopt. But we believe there will little substantive progress until someone takes the risks.
Conclusions
Much technology for protecting information owners', librarians', and end users' legitimate interests is understood, except that interesting and amusing lacunae exist among theoretically feasible measures. We can be confident that the latter will be mostly be filled before or when the risks they respond to become economically important. Most of this technology will be motivated by other application domains than digital library --most visibly in the next few years from satisfying the needs of electronic commerce. For portions we need to develop specially for digital library, promising directions have recently become clear.
Processes and databases to record the rules for managing intellectual property and access control databases can be made to be similar. We believe these similarities will offer simplifications for both users and software providers. Twenty-five years of scholarly publication provides a sufficient basis to design a comprehensive access control system to satisfy most published statements of need and to replace aging software which has been tinkered with for too long and developed too many accidental differences in systems which must be used together. We think we know how to do this and will look into it in the immediate future. Database for access and permissions is THE key building block which is needed for responsible collection management, but missing in wide deployment.
Cryptolope technology is "right"; its elegant design is close to ready for practical service.
Watermarking has some way to go before we will understand how dependable it is for ownership certification. Document owners can confidently deploy it in the near future to assure their users that information received is trustworthy.
We believe it is unreasonable to expect to use personal computers to enforce content providers' interests as so-called "trusted systems" [Stefik 1997 ]. Further, we believe it would mislead the public to refer even to clearance centers as "trusted systems"; to convey what useful function such machines and their human managers can provide, it would be better to call them "trustworthy services". Running server machines within prudently managed "glass houses" [Rosen 1998 ], with prudent audit ], continues to be essential for any service called "secure".
To teach protection technology, it helps to partition it into elements useful within protection boundaries (a.k.a. administrative domains), elements which extend the effective reach of protection boundaries, and elements which help beyond protection boundaries. The prominent tools are respectively: user authentication, authorization (access control) and permissions management; cryptographic packages, digital signatures and certificates, and hierarchies of trust; and marking technology.
Prototypes, ours and others, have been sufficiently developed to be bases for confidence in broadly-applicable designs and building production pilots. Why have we not already built them? Although many enterprises urge the need for tools like those described and alluded to above, and although our prototypes have not suffered any compelling criticisms, none of the organizations which profess the need has yet been ready to deploy a pilot to scale. We are leery of building something without a committed user community, because software built on speculation so often misses the mark. Deployment is a bigger challenge than technology enhancement. Although during the day we are confident in the emerging understanding of protection technologies, in the darkness of the night we also harbor nagging doubts that our understanding will be complete and that we have truly avoided egregious error. Part of the purpose of this article is to expose our views openly and widely. The author and his colleagues sincerely solicit constructive criticism of what has been presented in the Safeguarding ... series, and will endeavor to respond directly, and in future articles, to criticisms received.
